Abstract: Local governments inevitably face potential failures in disaster management practices. These failures not only threaten public safety and property but also pose significant risks to governmental trust. Rebuilding trust in local governments after disasters has become a critical issue in modern emergency management. Drawing on social-equilibrium theory and structural theory, this study employs two experiments (focusing on incompetence context and dishonesty context) with a single-factor, pretest-posttest between-participants design to examine and compare the effectiveness of two trust repair strategies, that is holding officials accountable and improving governance mechanisms. The findings reveal that when trust damage stems from governmental incompetence, both strategies can effectively repair trust, with no significant difference in their effectiveness; when trust damage stems from governmental dishonesty, both strategies can effectively restore trust, but holding officials accountable proves significantly more effective than improving governance mechanisms. This study extends theoretical understanding of trust repair in the context of emergency management during natural disasters. It also aids local governments in identifying the type of post-disaster trust damage and selecting the most effective trust repair strategy accordingly.